Abstract We shed light on an old problem by showing that the logic LP cannot define a binary connective d obeying detachment in the sense that every valuation satisfying ϕ and pϕ d ψq also satisfies ψ, except trivially. We derive this as a corollary of a more general result concerning variable-sharing.
Introduction
One approach to resolving logico-cum-semantic paradoxes [4; 8] is to reject the existence of any detachable conditional or, more generally, any detachable connective-a binary connective d for which 'modus ponens' holds (i.e., ϕ and ϕ d ψ jointly imply ψ). There is a roundabout proof that LP, the Logic of Paradox [2; 12] , is 'detachment-free', and so suitable for such an approach to paradox. The argument first shows, via a Kripke construction [6; 15] , that target LP truth theories (or, similarly, 'naïve set' theories) are 'non-trivial' (i.e., that while such theories are negation-inconsistent, not all sentences are true in them); in turn, one notes that if LP contained a detachable connective, the theories would be trivial (i.e., contain all sentences), and concludes that LP does not contain a detachable connective.
In this note, we offer a more direct, much simpler proof that LP is 'detachment-free' (in a sense to be defined) by showing that LP has a surprisingly strong variable-sharing property. We review LP in §2, set up terminology in §3, and give the result in §4. We close in §5 with a few remarks on a related logic in the vicinity of LP.
The logic LP
LP has the unary connective 2 and binary connectives and . A valuation for LP is a function v from the primitive propositions to ℘pt0, 1uqztru [7] .
Intuitively, values t1u and t0u correspond to the standard classical values of 'just true' and 'just false', respectively, while t1, 0u is the non-classical value 'both' (or, if you like, 'deviant'). For our purposes here, we pass quickly by further discussion of the philosophical interpretation of LP's semantic values, leaving this to other work on the topic [3; 5; 10; 13] .
An LP valuation v is extended to a function v ¦ on formulae with the same recursive clauses used in classical logic:
vppq when p is a propositional letter; v ¦ p2ϕq t1 ¡ n : n v ¦ pϕqu; v ¦ pψ ϕq tmintn, mu : n v ¦ pϕq and m v ¦ pψqu; v ¦ pψ ϕq tmaxtn, mu : n v ¦ pϕq and m v ¦ pψqu. We say that a valuation v satisfies a formula iff 1 v ¦ pψq. Proof By structural induction, if vppq t0, 1u for each propositional variable p then also v ¦ pϕq t0, 1u. The result follows from agreement.
Finally, where Γ is any set of formulae, we define the (model-theoretic or 'semantic') entailment relation @ in familiar terms: Γ @ ϕ iff any valuation that satisfies Γ satisfies ϕ.
We follow standard conventions of abbreviation for the set of premises, writing
LP owes its usefulness for reasoning in the face of contradiction (e.g., paradox) to the fact that, unlike classical logic, it is paraconsistent, meaning that pϕ 2ϕq B ψ.
-fails to obey detachment because of any valuation v such that vpϕq t0, 1u and vpψq t0u. Such a valuation is the key to showing the results below.
Finally, a connective might obey detachment trivially, for example conjunction (). Trivially? Yes: ϕ, pϕ ψq @ ψ but only because pϕ ψq @ ψ.
Such cases are of no interest to us: we say that they are trivial. We derive this as a corollary of a more general (and rather striking) result:
and none of the formulae in Γ 1 contain propositional variables that also appear in ϕ then Γ 2 @ ϕ.
Proof Let v be a valuation that satisfies everything in Γ 2 . Modify v to v I by making it equivocate on all the variables that do not appear in ϕ. We are assuming that each formula ψ in Γ 1 contains only variables that do not appear in ϕ and so is satisfied by v I (by Remark 2.1). But then v I satisfies everything in Γ 1 and in Γ 2 and so also satisfies ϕ. Finally, by the agreement property (see §2), v also satisfies ϕ.
Although, strictly speaking, LP is not a 'relevant (-ance) logic' because of examples such as ϕ @ pψ 2ψq, Theorem 4.2 shows why LP is 'almost relevant', in the sense that if Γ @ ϕ then Γ and ϕ must share a variable, unless @ ϕ. The result can also be strengthened by a result of Arieli et al [1] , according to which LP is a 'maximally paraconsistent logic' in the sense that there is no proper paraconsistent extension of the entailment relation | ù satisfying some fairly minimal conditions. In particular, there can be no paraconsistent way of adding a rule of detachment to any LP-definable connective, via some proof theoretic presentation or alternative semantics. 6 Nonetheless, it is possible to add a new detachable connective to LP. Several examples of such connectives have been considered in the literature, notably the relevant logic RM3 and the logic L from [11] defined by the following tables: t1u t0, 1u t0u t1u t1u t0u t0u t0, 1u t1u t0, 1u t0u t0u t1u t1u t1u t1u t0, 1u t0u t1u t1u t0, 1u t0u t0, 1u t1u t0, 1u t0u t0u t1u t1u t1u
RM3 LP
From the results of [1] , these two logics are also maximally paraconsistent. L but not RM3 also has the Deduction Theorem. Nonetheless, neither of these logics can claim to be a logic of paradox ; both fall to Curry's paradox, in the form pp Ø pp Ñ| ù q, which leads to triviality when the logic is applied to theories of truth, sets or properties that allow self-reference, specifically, for each proposition q a proposition p that is arrow-equivalent to pp Ñ qq.
Detachment in some closely related logics
One might think that the definition of entailment in LP is a little biased toward truth. Let us say that a valuation v falsifies ϕ iff 0 v ¦ pϕq. Then a reasonable requirement for ϕ to be a consequence of Γ is 'backwards falsitypreservation', namely, that there is no valuation that falsifies the conclusion ϕ without also falsifying one of the premises in Γ. We will write this as Γ A ϕ.
Since pp 2pq is falsified by every valuation, pp 2pq A q holds, and so A is not itself paraconsistent. Moreover, A lacks LP's property of sharing the tautologies of classical logic. In fact, A is paracomplete, 7 meaning that C pp 2pq.
8 On a more positive note, it has a detachable connective: 9 ϕ, p2ϕ ψq A ψ Despite this, A may still play a role in detachment-free approaches to paradox if we take both it and @ to be necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for entailment. In particular, define ( as follows:
Γ ( ϕ iff Γ @ ϕ and Γ A ϕ. The combined logic ( is both paraconsistent and paracomplete, and is detachment-free for the obvious reason that if ϕ, pϕ d ψq ( ψ then ϕ, pϕ d ψq @ ψ, which we have seen in Theorem 4.1 not to be the case.
Interestingly, the analogue of Theorem 4.2 does not apply, as the following fact implies: pϕ 2ϕq ( pψ 2ψq.
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Notes
1. This is equivalent to the well-known 'strong Kleene' (K3) valuations. In particular, the table for negation is given by ϕ ϕ t0u t1u t0, 1u t0, 1u t1u t0u
K3 and LP differ not in the set of valuations but in their accounts of satisfaction-the latter 'designating' both t1u and t1, 0u while K3 designates only t1u. See below.
2. D. Lewis [10] suggests an interpretation of the third truth value of LP (and related logics) as representing an ambiguity between true and false readings of a sentence, and relates this to the fallacy of equivocation; but we do not intend any more direct connection to his work.
3. The terminology comes from the thought of having coherent theories that go 'beyond consistency', so-called negation-inconsistent but non-trivial theories:
theories T such that, for some ϕ and ψ, both ϕ P T and ϕ P T but ψ R T .
4. To be precise, say that d satisfies detachment trivially if for all ψ1 and ψ2, pψ1 d ψ2q ( ψ2. Other trivially detaching connectives are obtained by taking any formula ϕpϕ, ψq that entails ψ as the definition of d, for example, ψ, ψ, pψ ϕq, etc.
5. Our first reaction to this theorem was to describe it as 'interpolation-like' but an anonymous referee convinced us that the matter is delicate. As the referee noted, Takano's result [14] immediately delivers interpolation for LP; however, it is not clear that interpolation is really of relevance to detachment-freedom.
6. Our thanks to the Journal's anonymous referee for this insight. The possibility of adding a detachable connective, specifically LP , was pointed out to us by Koji Tanaka and Patrick Girard.
7. The terminology comes from the thought of having coherent theories that go 'beyond completeness', so-called negation-incomplete but non-empty theories:
theories T such that, for some ϕ and ψ, both ϕ R T and ϕ R T but ψ P T .
8. ) is 'dual' to ( in that ϕ ) ψ iff ψ ( ϕ. In fact, this logic is none other than Kleene's strong three-valued logic K3 [9] in disguise. Satisfaction for K3
is defined by taking t1u to be the only designated value, so that a valuation K3-satisfies ϕ iff it does not falsify ϕ. See fn. 1.
9. Proof: suppose for contradiction that v falsifies ψ but neither premise:
0 R v ¦ pϕq so v ¦ pϕq t1u. But then v ¦ p ϕq t0u and so 0 P v ¦ p ϕ _ ψq, contradicting the assumption that v does not falsify p ϕ _ ψq.
10. Proof: pϕ^ ϕq ) pψ_ ψq since ) is not paraconsistent; pϕ^ ϕq ( pψ_ ψq because ( is not paracomplete.
